











Lancaster University Management School 







Diversity, choice and the quasi-market: An empirical 






Steve Bradley and Jim Taylor  
 
 
The Department of Economics                        
Lancaster University Management School 




© Steve Bradley and Jim Taylor  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/publications/ 
LUMS home page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/   1
 
Diversity, choice and the quasi-market: An empirical analysis  
of secondary education policy in England 
 
Steve Bradley and Jim Taylor
* 
 
Department of Economics 
Lancaster University 










This paper investigates the extent to which exam performance at the end of compulsory 
education has been affected by three major education reforms: the introduction of a quasi-
market following the Education Reform Act (1988); the specialist schools initiative 
introduced in 1994; and the Excellence in Cities programme introduced in 1999. We use 
panel data for all state-funded secondary schools in England over 1992-2006. Using a panel 
of schools for all state-funded secondary schools in England (1992-2006), we find that about 
one-third of the improvement in school exam scores is directly attributable to the combined 
effect of the education reforms. The distributional consequences of the policy, however, are 
estimated to have been favourable, with the greatest gains being achieved by schools with the 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
Over recent decades, and in countries as diverse as Australia, Chile, India, New Zealand, 
Sweden, the US and the UK, governments have decentralised the provision of compulsory 
education in the hope of stimulating improvements in the educational attainment of pupils 
(Fiske and Ladd, 2000). The debate about the most appropriate method of providing 
education has a long history (Friedman, 1962) and has spurred a growing body of theoretical 
analyses (Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar, 2000; Fernandez and Rogerson 1999; Hoxby, 
1998, 1999; Nechyba, 2000; De Fraya, Oliveira and Zanchi, 2006). In addition, a large 
number of empirical analyses have been undertaken, particularly in the USA. In both the 
theoretical and empirical literature, the critical issue is the trade-off between efficiency and 
equity. Those who oppose a decentralised approach to educational provision argue that it will 
lead to an increase in socio-economic segregation and ultimately greater income inequality 
(Levin, 1991a, 1991b). It is also argued that the wider social benefits generated by education - 
such as citizenship, a deeper sense of community and knowledge spillovers - can only be 
internalised through centralised provision. In contrast, proponents of a decentralised system 
argue that decentralisation is more likely to lead to an increase in allocative and productive 
efficiency (Hoxby, 1996). In addition, there is considerable disagreement over the 
effectiveness of resource-based education policy initiatives, especially those related to 
teaching inputs (Hanushek 2003; Krueger 2003).   
  In the UK, the education policy agenda has manifested itself in a series of education 
reforms across the entire school sector, beginning with the Educational Reform Act of 1988, 
which sought to stimulate the creation of a quasi-market in primary and secondary education. 
At the heart of these reforms were measures to increase parental choice and competition for 
pupils between schools. These quasi-market reforms have been accompanied by a substantial 
increase in expenditure on education since Labour came to power in 1997. At secondary 
school level, total real expenditure increased by 60% from £9.9b in 1997/8 to £15.8b in 
2006/7, while real expenditure per FTE pupil has increased by over 50%, from £3206 in 
1997/8 to £4836 in 2006/7 (at 2005/6 prices).1  
  Two expenditure based reforms have figured prominently in the secondary education 
sector in England. The specialist schools initiative was introduced in 1994 to increase the 
diversity of secondary education provision, thereby enhancing parental choice. In addition, in 
                                                 
1  See DCSF, Annual Report 2007, p102 and Annual Report 2008, p.150, annex N.   3
1999 the Labour Government introduced the Excellence in Cities Initiative (EiC), which 
sought to improve the educational performance of pupils in secondary schools located in the 
most disadvantaged urban areas. The key distinguishing feature of this policy initiative was to 
provide more resources to schools with a high proportion of pupils from poor families and to 
stimulate cooperation between schools, in the context of partnership agreements, by sharing 
good practice (Kendall et al. 2005; Machin, McNally and Meghir, 2007). 
  Several previous papers have investigated the effects of the quasi-market in secondary 
education in England on exam results, school efficiency and equality of educational 
opportunity (Bradley and Taylor, 2002, 2004; Bradley, Johnes and Millington, 2004). More 
recently, Taylor (2007) has estimated the impact of the specialist schools initiative on 
examination outcomes. In the present paper, we draw these previous strands of our research 
together to measure the impact of this trinity of education reforms on the change in exam 
performance in secondary schools over the period 1992-2006. Our focus is on the proportion 
of pupils who obtain five or more ‘good’ grades in the General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) exams, which are taken by all pupils in England at age 16.2 The proportion 
of pupils in England obtaining ‘good’ exam grades rose from 35.5% in 1992 to 58.3% in 
2006, a dramatic improvement. Our aim is to answer three questions: First, what fraction of 
this improvement in exam performance can be attributed to the education reforms identified 
above? Second, which, if any, of the three major education reforms have had the greatest 
impact in raising exam performance in secondary schools? Third, have the reforms had any 
distributional consequences? For, instance, how do the effects of the education reforms vary 
by pupil composition in a school, such as family income and ethnicity?   
  To answer these questions we use a panel of secondary schools covering the period 
1992-2006, which has the advantage that we can take a medium-term view of the effect of the 
quasi-market reforms, the EiC programme and the specialist schools initiative. Moreover, by 
incorporating all three policy initiatives into our analysis, we are able to get a better feel for 
the relative importance of each policy reform since the early 1990s through to 2006. From a 
technical point of view, using a panel of schools allows us to control for school-level 
unobserved heterogeneity and so reduce the bias caused by endogeneous school choice.  
                                                 
2 The GCSE exam is taken in approximately 8 to 10 subjects by pupils aged 15-16. Pupils undertake coursework 
and exams in most subjects and a ‘good’ grade is one in the range A*-C. The Government uses the proportion of 
pupils obtaining 5 or more A*-C grades in the GCSE exams as the benchmark for measuring a school’s success. 
The GCSE is a standard, norm-based, examination taken by almost all pupils, and the eight pass grades range 
from A* to G.  Grades A* to C are considered acceptable for entry to university, together with passes in more 
advanced examinations (A and AS levels) two years later.    
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  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, we briefly describe the 
education reforms that have led to the creation of the quasi-market in secondary education, the 
specialist schools initiative and the EiC programme. A brief review of previous empirical 
studies is also provided. Section III introduces the data, identifies the determinants of school 
performance and presents our econometric methodology. Section IV discusses the results of a 
statistical analysis of changes in school performance over the period 1992-2006. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II  CHOICE AND COMPETITION IN SECONDARY EDUCATION 
 
The introduction of a quasi-market in secondary education in England 
Over the last twenty years, the provision of education in Britain has been radically 
transformed by a series of reforms, many of which stem from the Education Reform Act 
(1988). These reforms have led to the creation of a quasi-market in secondary education (Le 
Grand, 1991, 1993; Glennerster, 1991).3 As a result, a centralised-state model of educational 
provision has been replaced by a more decentralised approach. The salient institutional 
features of the quasi-market in England’s schools have been described in detail elsewhere 
(Bradley, Crouchley, Millington and Taylor 1998). The two main tenets of the decentralised 
approach are greater parental choice over the school attended by their child and an increase in 
competition for pupils between schools. Parents may be expected to take a school’s exam 
performance into account, amongst other factors, in deciding on an appropriate school for 
their child, thus increasing allocative efficiency through greater choice.4 5  
  Schools have an incentive to recruit pupils because funding is linked directly to pupil 
numbers, and allowing schools to determine their own allocation of funding was expected to 
result in greater productive efficiency. By allowing schools to compete for pupils, it was 
expected that educational performance would improve. Successful schools would thrive while 
unsuccessful schools would either close, become smaller or improve their own performance 
in response to competition. It is expected that schools are most likely to respond positively to 
competition from rival schools in the local quasi-market. Similarly, the greater the amount of 
                                                 
3 Glennerster (1991) explains why the quasi-market is not a full market solution. 
4 Data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) indicate that choice of secondary 
school is influenced primarily by family and friends (66%), a school’s location (63%) and a school’s exam 
performance (38%). Other less important factors are religious considerations (8%) and other characteristics of 
the school (7%). It is worth noting that 86% of parents indicated that their child went to their first-choice school.  
5 Information about each school’s exam performance is provided by the annual publication of the School 
Performance Tables.   5
choice available to parents in an education market place, reflected by the number of schools in 
the district, the stronger the competition effect should be. 
  The sorting of pupils between schools and cream-skimming by ‘good’ schools, 
however, could have distributional consequences. Pupils from poorer families may 
increasingly become concentrated in the ‘poor’ (i.e. worst performing) schools whereas pupils 
from wealthier families become increasingly concentrated in ‘good’ schools. Cream-
skimming by schools reinforces this process of segregation, insofar as schools which face an 
excess demand for places are more likely to ‘select’ those pupils with the best chance of being 
successful in national exams, thereby making the school more popular with potential entrants. 
In contrast, failing schools have little option but to accept less able pupils. 
  For the US, there is a growing body of evidence that examines the effect on school 
performance of competition between state-funded schools (Borland and Howsen, 1992) and 
competition between school districts (Blair and Staley, 1995; Marlow, 1997, 2000; Zanzig, 
1997). Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006) review this evidence and conclude that it is at best 
‘mixed’. Furthermore, there is still very little empirical evidence for the UK (Levacic and 
Hardman, 1998). Bradley et al (2000) tested to see if a quasi-market in the secondary 
education sector had been created, whereas Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001) investigate 
the determinants of school efficiency. Both studies conclude that the greater the competition 
among schools, the larger the improvement in exam performance and efficiency. Moreover, 
‘good’ schools have grown more rapidly and expanded their pupil capacity to accommodate 
the excess demand for places. However, both studies focused on a fairly brief time period 
(1992-98), and it is possible that the quasi-market has become more effective as schools have 
adapted their behaviour over a longer time period.  
  More recently, Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2006) have analysed the effect of choice 
and competition in the primary school sector within a 45km radius of Central London using 
pupil level data from the National Pupil Database. Choice and competition are measured by 
the number of schools in a district and the average distance between home and schools in the 
district. They find little evidence that choice and competition improve exam performance 
amongst English primary schools. Church schools do respond positively to competition, 
however, especially where their competitors are also church schools in more competitive 
markets. Moreover, the benefits of this competition are highest for pupils in church schools 
with a greater proportion of children from low-income families. The authors conclude that the 
effects of choice and competition in raising the exam performance of pupils in the primary 
school sector have not been substantial or widespread.  These results also imply that choice   6
and competition only have beneficial effects where there is heterogeneity amongst primary 
schools, in this case in terms of their religious background.  
 
The specialist schools initiative – increasing diversity and choice 
The second major education reform in the secondary school sector in England since the early 
1990s has been the implementation of the specialist schools initiative. Specialist schools are 
state-maintained secondary schools with a designated subject specialism. Schools have an 
incentive to acquire specialist status because they receive a capital grant of £100,000 and 
extra funding of £129 per pupil for at least four subsequent years, thereby raising income per 
pupil by around 5% a year. The policy began with the designation of technology colleges in 
1994 and the Government’s aim is that all secondary schools in England will ultimately have 
specialist status (Levacic and Jenkins 2004). The objective is to improve exam performance 
through greater subject specialisation and hence greater choice. Moreover, since 2004, 
schools have been allowed to have two specialisms in any combination of subjects.6 
  There is conflicting evidence on the success of the specialist schools initiative. 
Evidence in support of a positive effect of specialist schools on exam performance is provided 
by Gorard (2002), Jesson (2002), Jesson and Crossley (2004) and OFSTED (2005). This has 
led the Government to argue that the programme has been extremely successful. This view 
has been challenged by the Education and Skills Committee of the House of Commons 
(House of Commons, 2003, p.4). Furthermore, Schagen and Goldstein (2002) have 
highlighted the methodological weaknesses of analyses that do not use multi-level modelling 
techniques and are especially critical of the school-level analyses conducted by the Specialist 
Schools Trust (see also Noden and Schagen, 2006). Taylor (2007) argues that previous 
research suffers from a serious weakness: no attempt has been made to investigate whether 
the switch to specialist status has been associated with a subsequent change in a school’s 
performance over time.   
 
Excellence in cities 
The EiC programme was a major government policy which aimed to raise the standard of 
education for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds in urban schools. The policy 
was launched in 1999 and was initially targeted at 471 secondary schools in 25 local 
                                                 
6 In 2006/7, 10% of all maintained secondary schools had two specialisms.  See the Standards Site at the 
Department of Children, Schools and Families (http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/specialistschools/). Acquiring 
a second specialism extends the period over which the extra funding per pupil is provided.    7
education authorities in the major cities of England. The programme was extended in 2000 
(351 schools in phase 2) and again in 2001 (165 schools in phase 3), covering approximately 
one third of all secondary schools which have been organised into 57 partnerships (Kendall et 
al. 2005).7 The EiC aimed to diversify provision in secondary schools so that the needs of all 
pupils (‘gifted and talented’ as well as ‘disadvantaged’) were met in the context of 
cooperation between schools, organised through local partnerships.8 The objectives of the 
programme were to improve educational performance by raising the motivation and 
expectations of pupils, improving the quality of teaching and changing school ethos through 
partnerships to encourage cooperation between schools.9  
  A DfES-funded evaluation of the EiC programme, based on both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, concluded that the programme created a positive ethos towards learning 
in the recipient schools, resulting in improved pupil motivation and behaviour, and also better 
attendance (Kendall et al., 2005). These changes are regarded as important for subsequent 
improvements in exam performance. Kendall et al. show that there was an almost immediate 
impact of the EiC programme but this was confined to attainment in maths at the end of Key 
Stage 3 for pupils in the most disadvantaged schools. In a quantitative analysis, Machin et al. 
(2004) estimate that the EiC programme led to an increase of 3% in the proportion of pupils 
moving up a grade. Much weaker effects were found for English, however, than for maths. In 
a more recent paper, Machin et al. (2007) investigate the distributional effects of the EiC 
policy, focusing on exam outcomes at age 14 (i.e. Key Stage 3). They find that the EiC policy 
increased the probability of a pupil attaining level 5 or above in more disadvantaged schools 
by 3.4 percentage points for those schools in Phase 1, falling to 2.4 percentage points for 
Phase 3 schools. Similarly, larger effects are observed for pupils of high or medium ability 
within more disadvantaged schools. Insofar as the positive effects of the EiC programme 
disseminate throughout the school over time, we might expect an improvement in exam 
performance of pupils in participating schools. Furthermore, this effect should be stronger for 
phase 1 schools because there has been more time for good practice to be effective.  
                                                 
7 Expenditure on the EiC programme rose from £24 million in 1999/2000 to £139 million in 2000/2001 and then 
to £386 million in 2005/2006. This represented approximately 4.3% of total local authority current expenditure 
on secondary schools, which was £9b million in 2000/2001. Total funding of the EiC programme during 1999-
2006 has been around £1.7bn and the funding per pupil has been around £140 per pupil. See ‘EiC 1999-2006’ on 
the Standards Site, DCSF (http://www.standards.dcsf.gov.uk/sie/eic/). 
8 Specifically, the EiC programme established learning mentors, to provide support for students with educational 
and/or behavioural difficulties; learning support units, to provide short-term support for ‘difficult to teach’ 
pupils; and the gifted and talented programme. The latter has focused on the most able 5-10% of pupils.  
9 See Excellence in Cities: The National Evaluation of a Policy to Raise Standards in Urban Schools 2000-2003 
by Kendall et al. (2005) for a fuller discussion of the EiC programme.   8
 
III.        DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data 
The two main data sources used in the present study are the School Performance Tables, 
published annually by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF, formerly 
the DfES) and the unpublished annual Schools’ Census. The School Performance Tables 
contain information about the exam performance of pupils (at school level) in all maintained 
secondary schools in England. The Schools’ Census provides information on, for example, 
admissions policy, gender mix, the number of teaching staff and support staff, the pupil-
teacher ratio, the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals or with special 
educational needs. Data from these two data sets are available from 1992 through 2006, thus 
providing a consistent time series for our analysis. Additional information about specialist 
schools and schools involved in the EiC programme was obtained from the DCSF.   
  As explained above, school performance is measured here by the proportion of pupils 
obtaining five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, which are defined as ‘good’ exam grades.10 
This measure provides schools, parents and the government with a simple and readily 
understandable indicator of the exam performance of each school. Table 1 shows that there 
has been a sustained increase in the proportion of pupils obtaining ‘good’ exam grades. A 
primary advantage of this measure of exam performance is that it is available at school level 
from 1992 onwards, which means that it covers the entire period during which the 
government policies investigated in this paper have been in operation. It is particularly useful 
for estimating the impact of the specialist schools initiative and the EiC programme since both 
of these policies began after the start of the study period. We therefore have a pre-policy 
period that can be used as a control for estimating the post-policy effects.  
 
Econometric methodology 
Following Hanushek (1979, 1986) we estimate an education production function, which in its 
simplest form is as follows: 
 
Ys = f (PUPs , FAMs , NEIGHs , SCHs ) + errors     (1) 
 
                                                 
10 The correlation between the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more GCSEs at grades A* to C and exam 
performance measured by the average number of points obtained per pupil (first made available in 1999) is 0.97.   9
where Y is an educational outcome of school s (e.g. exam results), PUP indexes observed 
pupil characteristics, FAM refers to family background factors, NEIGH indicates 
neighbourhood influences and SCH represents a set of school inputs, such as the pupil-teacher 
ratio. Given our focus on the effects of education policy on educational outcomes, Equation 1 
can be extended to include policy variables:   
 
Ys = f (PUPs , FAMs , NEIGHs , SCHs , COMPs , SPECs , EiCs ) + errors   (2) 
 
Following the discussion in the previous section, three major policies directed at secondary 
schools are added to the model. The first is the competition between schools for pupils 
(COMP) which emerged from the creation of a quasi-market in education; the second is the 
specialist schools initiative (SPEC); and the third is the Excellence in Cities programme 
(EiC).   
Finding an appropriate measure of the degree of competition facing each school is not 
clear cut. The most obvious measure is an index of the extent to which pupils are concentrated 
in a district’s schools, such as the Herfindahl index.11 Indices of concentration, however, are 
unlikely to be appropriate in the present context since they fail to capture the impact of 
changes in the competitive pressure facing schools over time. This is because measures of the 
concentration of pupils in a district’s schools tend to be very stable over time (see Table 1) 
simply because very few schools close or merge. Furthermore, schools face a trade-off 
between recruiting more pupils for financial reasons and maintaining their exam performance 
to ensure their competitive edge in the education market place. Hence, schools may be 
expected to engage in cream-skimming, whereby even non-selective (comprehensive) schools 
exercise some control over their admissions by attracting pupils likely to perform well 
academically.  
A measure of competition used in previous work (Bradley et al 2000), which more 
closely reflects the dynamic and quality aspects of competition between schools, is their 
relative exam performance. To remain competitive in the local market for pupils, a school 
will strive to improve its own exam performance in line with improvements by its 
competitors. If a school’s competitors are improving their exam scores at a faster rate than 
itself, the school is likely to suffer a decline in its share of the district’s pupils. The primary 
                                                 
11 The Herfindahl index is the sum over all schools in a district of si
2, where si is each school’s share of the 
district’s pupils.  
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variable driving a school’s exam performance is therefore likely to be the exam performance 
of other schools in the same district. We consequently use the lagged mean exam score of all 
other schools in the same district as an indicator of the intensity of the competition for pupils 
facing individual schools. We also estimate the model using the lagged Herfindahl index as an 
alternative measure of competition in the regression analysis below. 
The potential impact of the competition for pupils on a school’s exam performance 
can also be investigated in other ways. First, an important feature of the quasi-market is 
parental choice of school. We address this by stratifying our data according to the number of 
schools in a district since parental choice is likely to be greater in districts with more schools.  
The district is used as the geographical education market since transport networks are 
important for secondary school pupils and these are based primarily on local authority 
districts.12 Second, we also use the Herfindahl index to stratify districts according to the 
degree of market concentration faced by schools.  
SPEC is a dummy variable which is unity for those years during which a school has 
specialist status and zero otherwise; and similarly for the EiC programme. Therefore, for both 
SPEC and EiC we observe when the policy was ‘switched on’. As suggested earlier, the 
existence of specialist schools adds to the diversity of educational provision in a district and 
hence allows pupils to choose schools that better match their preferences and aptitudes. To the 
extent that this choice improves allocative efficiency, we expect SPEC to have a positive 
effect on educational outcomes. However, there may be variation in exam performance 
between schools with respect to the subject in which they choose to specialise. This could 
occur, for example, if there are variations between subjects in the availability of suitably 
qualified teachers, such as in science and maths, or perhaps because the extra funding has a 
greater impact per student in some subjects than in others. Ten subject specialisms are 
identified in our statistical analysis (see Table 2).  
The extra funding provided under the EiC programme was designed primarily to 
improve educational outcomes for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds in urban areas. 
The funding was provided to support cooperation between schools so that best practice could 
be diffused and the exam performance of ‘poor’ schools improved. It is therefore expected 
that the EiC variable will have a positive effect on the exam performance of schools, and 
these effects are likely to be larger the longer the school has been receiving such funding.  
                                                 
12 There are 366 local authority districts in England. We also investigate an alternative measure based on the 
number of other schools within a specific radius of each school, thus allowing competition between schools 
across district boundaries (see below).   11
Estimation of Equation 2, however, will produce biased results arising from the 
endogeneity of covariates and the existence of unobserved heterogeneity (Mayston, 2007; De 
Fraya, Oliveira and Zanchi, 2006). The error term in Equation 2 will include the effects of 
unmeasured features of both the school (e.g. teacher quality and school ethos) and the pupil 
(e.g. motivation and innate ability). These unobserved variables are likely to be correlated 
with observed covariates, and in particular with SPEC and EiC. There is also likely to be a 
correlation between family background and the school covariates. For instance, schools with a 
high proportion of pupils from ‘favourable’ family backgrounds (e.g. parents with a keen 
interest in their child’s education) are likely to find it easier to recruit ‘good’ teachers, leading 
to better educational performance. If schools with good exam results attract ‘good’ teachers, 
some of the school covariates will be endogenous. Ignoring these problems may lead to 
serious bias in the estimated coefficients of the school quality variables, such as the pupil / 
teacher ratio (Mayston, 2007).   
  We attempt to mitigate this bias by including a range of time-varying covariates at 
both school and district level in addition to school and district dummies. Our estimating 
equation is as follows: 
 
   Ysdt = α + γCOMPs,t-n + ηSPECs,t-n + δEiCs,t-n + Xstβ + Zdtθ + Ttτ + αs + αd + εsdt   (3) 
  
where: 
Y  = proportion of pupils achieving five or more A*-C grades in the GCSE exams  
              (at age16) 
COMP = proportion of pupils achieving five or more A*-C grades in the GCSE exams  
              (at age 16) in all other schools in the same district 
SPEC  = 1 if school had a designated specialism in year t (policy-on) and zero otherwise 
               (policy-off) 
EiC  = 1 if school was in an Excellence in Cities Partnership (policy-on) and zero 
               otherwise (policy-off)  
The vectors X and Z are a set of time-varying school and district covariates respectively; and 
the vector T is a set of year dummies. The coefficients  s α  and  d α  are school and district fixed 
effects, which will capture the impact of unobserved, time-invariant school and district-level 
factors. The inclusion of school and district dummies should help to mitigate the potential 
bias on the estimated policy effects. The error term ε is assumed to be normally distributed.   12
The vector X includes the following time-varying school-level variables: the pupil / 
teacher ratio, the number of pupils on the school roll, the proportion of pupils eligible for free 
school meals, the proportion with special needs and the proportion with English as their 
second language (see Table 1). The district level variables include the proportion of pupils 
eligible for free school meals in other schools in the same district, the pupil / teacher ratio and 
the change in pupil numbers. These district level variables are included to capture any shocks 
likely to impact on all schools. We note that there may be a problem arising from the 
endogeneity of the time-varying school-level controls, such as the pupil/teacher ratio and the 
number of pupils in a school, which might be expected to increase over time in schools that 
perform well compared to their competitor schools. This could give rise to bias in the 
estimated policy effects but it seems unlikely that the bias, if it exists, will be serious since 
school size does not normally change rapidly in the short to medium term due to capacity 
constraints in schools with a consistently good exam performance.   
  A further issue concerns the timing of the policy impacts. It seems likely that schools 
will react fairly quickly to increased competition from other schools in the same district since 
information about exam performance is readily available soon after the end of the school year. 
The impact of the specialist schools initiative and the EiC programme, however, is likely to 
be somewhat longer since their effect on exam results is likely to occur over several years. 
Longer time lags may therefore be appropriate for these two policy variables. The length of 
the lags is determined empirically in the results section below.  
The model can be modified in two ways to provide more information about the 
potential policy effects. First, since the EiC programme was introduced in three stages (in 
phases 1, 2 and 3 in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively), it is possible to estimate the impact of 
each phase separately. Second, the effect of the specialist schools initiative on exam results 
can be estimated for ten distinct specialist subject areas (see Table 2).   
 
IV.        RESULTS 
 
This section reports the estimated impact of the education reforms on exam performance.13 
We first estimate the individual impact of the three policy reforms. This is followed by 
estimates of their distributional impacts. We do this by sub-dividing schools into groups 
                                                 
13 The results reported here are based on an unbalanced panel since data are not available for the entire time 
period for a minority of schools. We note, however, that the results change very little when we use a balanced 
panel (containing 2645 schools over the entire time period 1992-2006).    13
according to the proportion eligible for free school meals, the proportion from ethnic 
minorities and the gender of a school’s pupils. Finally, we investigate whether the reforms 
have had differential effects according to school choice (measured by the number of schools in each 
district) and also according to market concentration (as measured by the concentration of pupils in 
schools within each district).  
 
The effect of the education reforms on exam performance 
In order to investigate the overall impact of the education reforms, we begin by regressing school 
exam performance on a set of year dummies in Model 1 (Table 3). This shows that the mean exam 
performance of all schools increased by 18 percentage points between 1994 and 2006. This serves as a 
benchmark for estimating the impact of the full range of variables specified in the previous section 
(see Equation 3 above). Models 2 and 3 differ only in so far as model 2 uses the Herfindahl index as 
the measure of competitiveness, whereas model 3 uses the lagged exam performance of other schools 
in the same district. Finally, model 4 estimates the impact of each of the three phases of the EiC 
programme and for each of the ten types of school specialism.    
We are not specifically interested in the variables used as controls but note that several are 
statistically significant in models 2 to 4. These include the proportion of pupils eligible for free school 
meals (both within the school and within the local authority district), the pupil / teacher ratio, school 
size and the proportion of pupils with special needs. The pupil / teacher ratio, the proportion of pupils 
eligible for free school meals and the proportion of special needs pupils are negatively related to exam 
performance, as expected. As in previous studies (Bradley and Taylor 1998), school size is found to be 
positively related to exam performance.14   
In view of the likelihood that education policies have a lagged impact on a school’s exam 
performance, we have experimented with policy lags of different length. As argued earlier, a one-year 
lag is probably appropriate for the competition variable since schools need to react quickly to 
improvements achieved by competing schools in the same catchment area if they are to maintain their 
competitiveness.15 The impact lag on exam performance of the EiC and specialist schools policies, 
however, is likely to be somewhat longer. The estimated coefficient on the EiC policy variable, for 
example, is 0.20 with a zero time lag compared to 0.30 when we use a two-year lag (the difference is 
highly statistically significant). Since using further lags (up to four years) does not result in a 
statistically significant change in the estimated coefficient, we use a two-year lag in all of the 
                                                 
14 We note that excluding the time-varying school-level controls has very little effect on the estimated policy 
impacts.   
15 We note that the estimated coefficient on the competition variable falls from 0.20 (se=0.012) to 0.13 
(se=0.012) when the competition variable is lagged by two years rather than one year.     14
regressions reported here.16 A two-year time lag is also used for the specialist schools variable, though 
there is little difference between the estimated coefficients using different lags in this case.  
Using the Herfindahl index (lagged one year) to measure competitiveness, we find a negative 
relationship as expected (see model 2), but the estimated coefficient indicates a very small impact 
since the Herfindahl is very stable over the study period (even within districts). This means that it does 
not (in this case) accurately track the extent to which schools are competing with each other for pupils 
following the introduction of the quasi-market. As argued in section III, the lagged exam performance 
of other schools in the same district is likely to provide a more sensitive measure of competitiveness 
than the Herfindahl in a time-series analysis. Schools that do not keep pace with other schools in the 
same catchment area are likely to lose market share.  
Replacing the Herfindahl with the lagged exam performance of other schools in the same 
district as the measure of competitiveness facing each school (see model 3), we find that a one 
percentage point increase in the exam performance of other schools in the same district is 
associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the school’s own exam performance. This 
suggests that competition between schools was associated with an improvement of 4 
percentage points in the overall exam score during 1994-2006.17 
The estimated coefficient on the EiC variable indicates that the EiC programme has 
been associated with a 3 percentage point improvement in the exam performance of those 
schools participating in the programme. The estimated impact of the specialist schools 
initiative, however, appears to have been quite small, with the acquisition of specialist status 
being associated with an improvement in exam performance of just under 1 percentage point. 
Adding the impact of the three education reforms together, we estimate that they improved 
overall exam performance by nearly six percentage points during 1994-2006. Model 3 
therefore indicates that around one-third of the improvement in exam results during 1994-
2006 can be directly attributed to the three major education reforms. The regression results 
also indicate that the trend growth in average school size of around 200 pupils per school 
during the period was associated with a two percentage point improvement in exam results.18  
                                                 
16 A disadvantage of extending the lag is that the sample size falls by over 3,000 schools for each extra one-year 
lag. 
17 This estimate is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient on the lagged exam performance of all other 
schools in the district (0.20) by the change in the exam performance of all other schools in the district over the 
period 1993-2006 (20 percentage points). 
18 A potential problem arises in the interpretation of the estimated policy effects on the EiC and specialist 
schools variables since a minority of schools acquired EiC status and specialist school status simultaneously.  
Omitting those schools with coterminous policies (about 20% of the total by 2006), the estimated policy effect 
falls from 0.30 to 0.20 on the EiC variable and from 0.008 to 0.004 on the specialist schools variable. (Both new 
estimates are still highly statistically significant.) In addition, the estimated policy effects for each of the three 
policies are unaffected by the omission of each policy variable in turn.   
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The impact of the specialist schools initiative and the EiC programme is investigated 
in more detail in Model 4. The EiC programme was phased in over three years and hence 
those in the first phase have received extra funding for longer and are expected to have 
experienced the greatest improvement in performance. On average, schools included in phase 
1 (in the 1999/2000 school year) witnessed a 3.4 percentage point improvement in exam 
performance, whereas those schools in phases 2 and 3 exhibit a significantly smaller 
improvement (2.6 and 2.8 percentage points respectively).19  
The specialist schools initiative can similarly be split into different specialisms in 
order to estimate the impact for each type of specialist school. When this is done, we find that 
the specialist schools initiative is significantly positively related to exam performance for only 
three of the ten specialisms (which accounted for 40% of all specialist schools in 2006). The 
impact on the exam performance of schools specialising in arts, business studies and 
technology is estimated to be 0.9, 1.8 and 2.2 percentage points respectively.  
Since the impact of education policies may change over time, it is useful to estimate 
the policy effects over different time periods. Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients over 
consecutively longer time periods running from 1994-2000 through to 1994-2006. The 
estimated impact of competition policy on exam results is shown to increase steadily over 
time as the quasi-market evolved, as we would expect. A similar result is obtained for the EiC 
programme, which is also estimated to have had a stronger impact over time for each of the 
three phases of the policy. This is consistent with the view that increasing school resources to 
raise the performance of pupils from deprived family backgrounds is likely to take time to 
change behaviour and attitudes towards schooling, thereby improving educational outcomes.  
By contrast, the specialist schools initiative appears to have become less effective over 
time, presumably because of the selective nature of the specialist schools initiative. In the 
earlier years of the programme, schools had to be seen to be performing well in order to be 
awarded specialist status, since poorly performing schools would be less likely to find 
sponsors to provide matched funding from the private sector.20 As the scheme expanded to 
cover the majority of schools (see Table 1), the effectiveness of the policy is estimated to 
have declined. This decline in the estimated impact of the specialist schools initiative may 
therefore be a consequence not of a causal effect of the policy but of a change in the 
characteristics of schools gaining specialist status. Schools gaining specialist status before 
                                                 
19 Machin, McNally and Meghir (2007) find that the impact of each phase of the EiC policy on Key Stage 3 
results in maths gradually builds up over time.   
20 The matched funding requirement has been relaxed in recent years.   16
2001, for example, had a better average exam performance than non-specialist schools. After 
2004, the reverse was the case. If schools with a poor exam performance were less likely to 
gain from acquiring specialist status than schools with a good exam performance, this 
compositional change could explain (at least in part) the decline in the estimated impact of the 
policy. The inclusion of variables such as the proportion of pupils eligible for free school 
meals to control for differences in the pupil composition of schools should, however, help to 
mitigate the influence of the compositional change on the estimated impact of the specialist 
schools initiative. At worst, it could be argued that the specialist schools policy may have 
been effective only for high performing schools.21 
 
The distributional effects of the education reforms 
In this section, we investigate whether the education reforms have benefited some groups of 
pupils more than others. Specifically, we test for the effect of the reforms according to family 
poverty, ethnicity and gender of admissions. Since the analysis is conducted at school level 
and not at pupil level, the results reported here should be taken as indicative of the 
distributional consequences of the reforms. Further work at pupil level is required to obtain 
more robust estimates.   
  The distributional consequences of the three policies are estimated here by dividing 
schools into quintiles according to a specific characteristic, such as the proportion of pupils 
eligible for free school meals (as in Table 5). We find that neither the specialist schools 
initiative nor the EiC programme had a significant impact on the exam performance of 
schools with a low proportion of pupils from poor families (relative to non-treated schools in 
the same quintile). There is some evidence, however, that the impact of the specialist schools 
initiative has been greater for schools with the highest proportion of pupils from poor families 
than for schools with lower proportions. 
  When schools are grouped according to the proportion of ethnic minority pupils, we 
find that the impact of all three policy reforms is estimated to be higher for schools with a 
high proportion of pupils from ethnic minorities (relative to non-treated schools in the same 
group). The estimated impact of the EiC programme, for example, is 2 percentage points for 
schools with less than 10% ethnic minority pupils compared to 3.6 percentage points for 
schools with more than 50% of its pupils from an ethnic minority (see Table 6). This result is 
                                                 
21 We thank one of the referees for suggesting this explanation to us.    17
not surprising since the EiC programme was aimed specifically at inner city schools with a 
high proportion of pupils from low income families. 
  The final distributional aspect of the benefits of the education reforms relates to 
gender differences in exam performance.22 The model is estimated for three different types of 
school according to whether they are boys-only, girls-only or co-educational schools (see 
Table 7). The most interesting, and perhaps most surprising, result is that single-sex schools 
benefited more from the EiC programme than did co-educational schools (relative to non-
treated schools in the same admissions category). This programme is estimated to have 
boosted exam performance by 4.6 and 6.2 percentage points in boys-only and girls-only 
schools respectively compared to only 2.7 percentage points in co-educational schools. 
Neither boys-only nor girls-only schools, however, are estimated to have benefited from the 
specialist schools initiative (relative to non-treated schools in the same admissions 
category).23  
 
Spatial variations in the effect of the policy reforms 
The impact of the degree of competition and of parental choice on a school’s attainment may 
be expected to vary between districts. Two measures are used here to capture these spatial 
disparities in competition and parental choice. The first is simply the number of schools in a 
district, which reflects the degree of choice available to parents. Dividing districts into 
categories according to the number of schools, we find that the estimated coefficient on the 
competition variable increases from 0.086 to 0.394 as we move from districts with less than 
five schools to districts with more than fifteen schools (see Table 8). Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient increases at an increasing rate. This result therefore supports the view that 
competition has been most effective in those districts where parental choice is greatest. 24  
  The second measure of competition at district level is the Herfindahl index, which is 
inversely related to the degree of concentration of pupils in a district’s schools. Dividing 
                                                 
22 The factors underlying the evolution of the gender gap in exam results are investigated by Andrews et al. 
(2006), who argue that part of the explanation for the trend improvement in girls’ exam results relative to boys 
was the switch to an examination system based more heavily on coursework from the late 1980s. There is 
evidence that girls prefer coursework and this could account for the increase in the gender gap as well as an 
improvement in results overall (Machin and McNally, 2005). See also Casson and Kingdom (2007) and 
Kingdom and Casson (2007).  
23 The proportion of boys-only and girls-only schools in an EiC partnership was 31% and 39% respectively. The 
gap in exam performance between non-EiC schools and EiC schools fell from 25.5 to 15.7 for boys-only 
schools, and from 21.9 to 12.7 for girls-only schools, between 2000 and 2006.   
24 A similar result is obtained when the number of schools within a radius of 7km of each school is used for 
dividing schools into groups instead of using the number of schools in the local authority district. The eastings 
and northings used to delineate the 7km radius for each school, and hence the number of other secondary schools 
within this radius, were obtained from the Postzon package.    18
districts into categories according to the degree of concentration of a district’s pupils, we find 
that the estimated coefficient on the competition variable increases from 0.096 in the quintile 
of schools with the highest concentration of pupils to 0.398 for schools in the lowest. There is 
therefore strong evidence that the impact of competition on a school’s exam performance is 
positively related to the degree of market concentration faced by schools within their 
catchment area.   
The impact of the EiC policy is also estimated to vary according to the degree of 
competition faced by schools. Its impact is estimated to be lowest in districts where 
competition is high (i.e. a low concentration of pupils in a district’s schools) and is estimated 
to be high in districts where competition is low. This result may be because the EiC 
programme depends on cooperation between schools and cooperation may be easier to 
achieve in districts with only a small number of schools involved in the programme.  
We therefore conclude, from the results in Tables 8 and 9, that competition works best 
where choice is greatest, and cooperation works best where there are fewer schools to 
coordinate in a partnership arrangement such as the EiC policy. 
 
V.         CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has investigated the impact on exam performance of three major education policies 
that have been introduced into England’s secondary schools during the past two decades. 
Following the Education Reform Act (DES, 1988), a quasi-market was created in the early 
1990s by providing schools with increasing control over their own resources and by linking 
each school’s funding more directly to its intake of pupils. On the other side of the equation, 
parental choice of school has been considerably increased. Moreover, schools were 
increasingly differentiated by the specialist schools initiative, which began in 1994 with the 
designation of technology colleges. In addition to expanding the choice set to ten different 
specialisms in subsequent years (and more recently to a combination of any two specialisms), 
policy has become more heavily focused on schools in areas of severe deprivation through the 
Excellence in Cities programme.  
  This paper has attempted to estimate the effect of these three education policies on the 
exam performance of pupils at the end of compulsory education. Our main findings, which 
are based on a panel of all secondary schools in England (1992-2006), are as follows. First, 
our estimates suggest that between 20% and 25% of the overall improvement in exam 
performance over the period 1992-2006 can be attributed specifically to the quasi-market   19
reforms. This policy had a far bigger impact, however, in areas where competition is likely to 
be more intense and where parental choice is likely to be greater. The impact of competition 
was found to be substantially greater, for example, in districts which had the most schools and 
in districts with the lowest concentration of pupils in just a few schools (as measured by the 
Herfindahl index).  
  Second, the impact of the specialist schools initiative on exam performance is 
estimated to have been modest, improving exam performance by less than one percentage 
point for specialist schools as a whole. Some specialisms, however, are estimated to have had 
a bigger impact on exam performance than others, with the largest effects being for schools 
specialising in technology (2.2 percentage points) and in business studies (1.8 percentage 
points). No discernible effect could be detected for the majority of specialist schools, 
however, suggesting that a large proportion of the specialist schools funding yielded no 
significant improvement in exam performance.  
Third, the Excellence in Cities programme is estimated to have had some success, 
insofar as it is estimated to have accounted for a 3 percentage point improvement in GCSE 
results for participating schools during 2000-06 (when exam results in England improved by 
11 percentage points overall). The overall effect on exam performance has been relatively 
small, however, since it has been mainly restricted to schools in deprived urban areas. 
  Although the education reforms are estimated to have had only a moderate impact on 
exam performance in aggregate, there is convincing evidence that the impacts that did occur 
have been distributionally beneficial. Our estimates suggest that the increased competition 
had the greatest impact on exam performance in those schools with the most disadvantaged 
pupils. The same result was obtained for the specialist schools initiative, which also had its 
biggest impact in schools with the most disadvantaged pupils. Specifically, these two policies 
benefited those schools with the highest proportion of pupils from poor families and with the 
highest proportion of ethnic minority pupils. The schools benefiting most from the EiC 
programme were those with a high proportion of pupils from ethnic minorities. This result is 
not surprising since the aim of the EiC programme was to raise attainment in deprived urban 
areas. In fact, all three policies are estimated to have had a greater impact on schools with a 
high proportion of ethnic minority pupils.  
  The impact of the education reforms taken as a whole has therefore been moderate, 
with about one-third of the total improvement in exam performance being directly attributable 
to these three education reforms. The question therefore arises as to what factors account for 
the improvement in secondary school exam results not accounted for by the reforms to   20
education policy considered in this paper. One possibility is that improvements to primary 
education have fed through into the secondary school sector as a result of programmes such as 
the literacy and numeracy hour (see Machin and McNally, 2008). Other possible explanations 
for the ‘unexplained’ improvement in exam results are that pupils and teachers have worked 
harder or that schools have been managed more efficiently. It may also be the case that exams 
have become easier or that assessment methods have become less stringent. In other words, 
there may have been grade inflation. These issues need to be investigated more fully using 
pupil level data in future research.  
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1992 35.5  15.3  19.2  819  17.1  1.3 0.7  0.0 0.0  0.126 
1993 37.8  15.7  18.7  846  17.2  1.6 0.7  0.0 0.0  0.127 
1994 39.9  15.8  19.4  868  18.5  1.9 0.7  1.2 0.0  0.126 
1995 40.7  15.9  19.2  892  19.1  2.1 0.7  2.5 0.0  0.127 
1996 42.1  16.2  19.7  901  19.4  2.3 0.7  4.6 0.0  0.127 
1997 42.5  16.3  16.8  912  19.5  2.5 0.7  6.8 0.0  0.127 
1998 43.8  16.5  20.0  922  18.8  2.7 0.8  9.5 0.0  0.128 
1999 45.7  16.6  19.4  942  18.1  2.7 0.8 11.9 0.0  0.129 
2000 47.0  17.0  15.1  968  17.5  2.1 0.8 15.7 13.5  0.129 
2001 48.3  17.0  17.4  989  16.9  2.1 0.8 20.4 23.1  0.128 
2002 49.9  16.9  17.8  1004  16.0  2.0 0.9 30.2 28.0  0.128 
2003 51.7  17.0  14.5  1022  15.6  1.5 0.9 45.0 28.1  0.128 
2004 52.9  17.0  16.5  1033  15.5  1.7 0.9 61.7 27.8  0.131 
2005 55.6  16.7  16.6  1032  15.3  2.6 0.9 74.3 28.1  0.128 
2006 58.3  16.6  16.6  1035  14.7  1.9 1.0 78.2 27.5  0.127 
Note: The Herfindahl index is the sum over all schools in a district of si






TABLE 2   Number of schools in each specialism in 2006 
 





Technology 1994  585  19 
Languages 1995  221  7 
Arts 1997  421  14 
Sport 1997  350  11 
Business 2002  229  7 
Engineering 2002 57  2 
Maths 2002  225  7 
Science 2002  303  10 
Humanities 2004  72  2 
Music 2004  27  1 
      
None   588  19 
      
Total   3078  100 
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TABLE 3   Estimated regressions 
 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable = proportion of pupils obtaining five or 
more A*-C grades 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Competitiveness      
Herfindahl index     -0.078* 
(0.033) 
  
Exam performance of other schools in district  
 




Excellence in Cities      






Excellence in Cities: phase 1 (1999/00) 
 
    0.034***
(0.002) 
Excellence in Cities: phase 2 (2000/01) 
 
     0.026***
(0.003) 
Excellence in Cities: phase 3 (2001/02) 
 
     0.028***
(0.004) 
Specialist status      




Arts       0.009***
(0.003) 
Business studies & enterprise        0.018***
(0.005) 
Engineering       0.001 
(0.008) 
Languages       -0.008** 
(0.003) 
Maths       -0.007 
(0.004) 
Science       -0.001 
(0.004) 
Sport       -0.001 
(0.003) 
Technology       0.022***
(0.002) 
Humanities       -0.012 
(0.015) 
Music       -0.033 
(0.027) 
School variables      
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Table 3 cont’d 
 
















District variables      
Proportion of pupils eligible for free school 



























































































































School fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
District fixed effects No  Yes  Yes  Yes
        
R-squared   0.07  0.91  0.91  0.91 
n 40320  39403  39403  39403 
Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The two measures of 
competitiveness (the Herfindahl index and the exam performance of other schools in the same district) are 
lagged one year in all regressions. The two policy variables (the Excellence in Cities programme and the 
specialist schools initiative) are lagged two years in all regressions.  
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EiC phase 1: 
1999/00 
EiC phase 2: 
2000/01 
















































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The coefficients 
reported in this table are obtained from regressions which include all of the controls used in estimating 






TABLE 5   Estimated policy effects by proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals 
 
Average % eligible for free school meals 





































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The coefficients reported 
in this table are obtained from regressions which include all of the controls used in estimating models 2 to 4 in 





TABLE 6   Estimated policy effects by proportion of pupils in ethnic minority 
 
Average % of pupils in ethnic 



























Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The coefficients reported in 
this table are obtained from regressions which include all of the controls used in estimating models 2 to 4 in Table 3 
above. The year dummies and the school and district fixed effects are also included.  
 
   29
TABLE 7   Estimated policy effects by gender of admissions 
 


























Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The coefficients reported in 
this table are obtained from regressions which include all of the controls used in estimating models 2 to 4 in Table 






















































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. There is no estimated 
coefficient for the EiC Partnership programme for districts with under eight schools since there were too few 
districts to obtain meaningful results. The coefficients reported in this table are obtained from regressions which 
include all of the controls used in estimating models 2 to 4 in Table 3 above. The year dummies and the school 




TABLE 9   Estimated policy effects by degree of concentration of pupils in schools within districts 
 






































Note: (   ) = standard errors. *, **, *** = significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The Herfindahl index is 
the sum over all schools in a district of si
2, where si is each school’s proportion of the district’s pupils. The 
coefficients reported in this table are obtained from regressions which include all of the controls used in 
estimating models 2 to 4 in Table 3 above. The year dummies and the school and district fixed effects are also 
included.  
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APPENDIX    
 
Descriptive statistics: average for each variable 1993-2006 
 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD 
Proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more A*-C grades in the 
General Certificate of Secondary Education exams at age 16  43469  0.47  0.21 
Pupil / teacher ratio   43514 16.50  1.65 
Part-time / full-time teachers  43510 0.18  0.12 
Number of pupils on school roll (in hundreds)  43513 9.54  3.33 
Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals  43514 0.17  0.15 
Proportion of pupils with special educational needs (‘statemented’)  42986 0.02  0.02 
Proportion of pupils with second language English  43050 0.01  0.02 
Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals in other schools 
in district (lagged one year)  43504  0.16  0.10 
Herfindahl index  43604 0.13  0.09 
Proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more A*-C grades in other 
schools in same district  43425  0.47  0.11 
Pupil / teacher ratio in district  43071 17.30  2.16 
Change in number of pupils in district (in hundreds)  43602 1.75 11.51 
   
 
 